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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
RUBEN BENITEZ, 
Petitioner/Appellant, 
v. 
UTAH DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH 
DIVISION OF HEALTH CARE FINANCING, 
Respondent/Appellee. 
CaseNo.20080957-CA 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT - APPELLEE 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Final Agency Order of the Utah Department of Health, Division of Health 
Care Financing was entered on September 24,2008. R. 48-64. Benitez timely sought 
reconsideration of the Final Agency Order (R. 65-68) that was denied on October 23, 
2008. R. 69-71. Ruben Benitez's Petition for Judicial Review was filed on November 
19,2008. This Court has jurisdiction over such petitions pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 
78A-4-103(2)(a) (West Supp. 2008) and Utah Code Ann. § 63G-4-401 (West Supp. 
2008). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUE ON APPEAL 
1. On appeal, petitioner claims that there was no residuum of admissible evidence 
to support the administrative decision. This issue was not raised during the administrative 
proceeding and cannot be raised for the first time on appeal. 
1 
ISSUE PRESERVED BELOW. This issue was not raised below and was not 
considered by the hearing officer. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: This issue is unique to this Court and does not 
entail review of the administrative decision. 
2. While administrative decisions can rely on inadmissible hearsay, there must 
also be a residuum of admissible evidence to support the agency's decision. There was 
such a residuum of evidence in this matter. 
ISSUE PRESERVED BELOW. This issue was not raised below and was not 
considered by the hearing officer. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: "Whether the factual findings were based on a 
residuum of competent evidence is a question of law which we review for correctness." 
Indus. Power Contractors v. Indus. Comm'n. 832 P.2d 477, 479 (Utah App. 1992). 
Whether evidence constitutes hearsay is a question of law that is reviewed for correctness. 
Prosper Inc. v. Dep't of Workforce Serv.. 2007 UT App 281, [^8, 168 P.3d 344. 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND RULES 
Utah R. Evid., Rule 803 (1) & (2). Hearsay exceptions; availability of declarant 
immaterial. 
The following are not excluded by the hearsay rule, even though the declarant is available 
as a witness: 
(1) Present sense impression. A statement describing or explaining an event or condition 
made while the declarant was perceiving the event or condition or immediately thereafter. 
(2) Excited utterance. A statement relating to a startling event or condition made while 
the declarant was under the stress of excitement caused by the event or condition. 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
By a letter dated June 5, 2008, Mr. Benitez was notified that an allegation of 
sexual abuse had been substantiated against him. Specifically, that Benitez, had 
inappropriately touched a resident of the Arlington Hills Health Care Center while he was 
employed there as a certified nurse aid (CNA). R. 2-3. On July 1,2008, Benitez 
requested a hearing concerning the allegation. R. 1. 
A formal administrative hearing was held on August 26, 2008.* A Recommended 
Decision was prepared by the Hearing Officer on September 17, 2008. R. 50-60. The 
Recommended Decision was adopted as the Final Agency Order on September 24, 2008. 
R. 48-64. Benitez sought reconsideration of the Final Agency Order (R. 65-68) that was 
denied on October 23, 2008. R. 69-71. Benitez's Petition for Judicial Review was filed 
on November 19, 2008. 
STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS 
The victim was a shy, quiet lady who stayed in her room by herself. Tr. 13. On 
April 19,2008, Benitez fondled the victim's vagina and touched her breast. R. 34. The 
victim consistently told the same story over a period of time; that the petitioner put his 
fingers into her vagina and touched her breast while he was supposed to be helping her by 
pulling up her brief after she had used the bathroom. R. 24-25, 27, 28, 34, 37; Tr. 14-17, 
19-22, 36. Maria Espinoza is a CNA who also worked at Arlington Hills. Tr. 39. 
1
 The transcript of the hearing is part of the record, but was not numbered as such. 
Throughout this brief, the transcript is cited as Tr. followed by the page number. 
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Immediately after the incident, the victim asked Benitez to find Ms. Espinoza. Tr. 56. 
Instead a different CNA (Kristen) joined Benitez in the victim's room, R. 34; Tr. 56. Ms. 
Espinoza entered the victim's room as Kristen was coming out. Ms. Espinoza testified 
that the victim was very upset and "kind of like she wanted to cry." The victim said that 
Benitez had touched her breasts and stuck his finger in the victim's vagina. Tr. 42, 44. 
The victim asked Ms. Espinoza, "How come you let that guy come into my room?" Tr. 
42, 44. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
At no time did the petitioner claim before the hearing officer that there wasn't a 
residuum of admissible evidence to support a finding that he had abused the victim. Only 
after the Agency Final Action did Benitez even claim that the evidence was hearsay, as 
part of his claim that the proceeding shouldn't have gone forward without the victim 
testifying in person. Tr. 65. Benitez's failure to raise this issue at the original hearing 
precludes any review on appeal. 
There was a residuum of admissible evidence to support the Agency's Final 
Action. Ms. Espinoza's testimony as to the victim's statements are admissible hearsay. 
Also the decision was supported by the non-hearsay evidence of Ms. Espinoza concerning 
the victim's state right after the abuse. Further, the Hearing Officer could rely upon her 
finding that Benitez's testimony as to what happened was implausible. 
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ARGUMENT 
I. PETITIONER'S FAILURE TO RAISE HIS RESIDUUM 
ARGUMENT BEFORE THE HEARING OFFICER PRECLUDES 
ANY REVIEW ON APPEAL 
Benitez did not claim that there was no residuum of admissible evidence before the 
administrative agency. Only afer the Final Agency Action was entered did he raise this 
issue in any manner in his petition for reconsideration. R. 65. Yet even there he never 
claimed that there was no residuum of admissible evidence, he only claimed that the 
decision should be reconsidered because the victim did not testify. "The alleged victim 
did not testify; thus, the only testimony against him was hearsay. No reason was 
provided as to why the alleged victim did not testify." R. 65. The petitioner cannot raise 
his claim that there was no residuum of admissible evidence to support the agency's 
decision for the first time on appeal. 
In Espinal v. Salt Lake City Bd. of Educ 797 P.2d 412 (Utah 1990), the plaintiffs 
raised a constitutional claim for the first time on appeal. In refusing to consider that 
claim, the court explained that 
Appellants' first claim is that the realignment violated article I, section 7 of 
the Utah Constitution by denying them the liberty to control their children's 
education. This claim was raised for the first time on appeal. With limited 
exceptions, the practice of this Court has been to decline consideration of 
issues raised for the first time on appeal. We therefore do not address this 
claim. 
Id. at 413 (citations omitted). The limited exceptions to this general rule deal with cases 
in which the appellant demonstrates that "the trial court committed plain error or 
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exceptional circumstances exist in this case." State v. Sepulveda, 842 P.2d 913, 917-18 
(Utah App. 1992) (footnote omitted). 
The same rule applies to administrative proceedings. "We have consistently held 
that issues not raised in proceedings before administrative agencies are not subject to 
judicial review except in exceptional circumstances." Brown & Root Indus. Serv. v. 
Indus. Comm'n. 947 P.2d 671, 677 (Utah 1997). 
Even if Benitez's petition for reconsideration were to be considered as having 
raised the issue, it would still come too late. The Utah Supreme Court has held "that a 
request for reconsideration is not the proper time to raise new arguments or new issues." 
Western Water. L.L.C. v. Olds. 2008 UT 18,1f3l, 184 P.3d 578 (State Engineer could not 
consider a new issue or argument on a request for reconsideration). 
Further, it was the petitioner's duty to raise all of his issues at all stages of the 
administrative proceeding. In Zupon v. Industrial Commission. 860 P.2d 960, 962 n.2 
(Utah App. 1993), this Court held that a petitioner's failure to raise an issue before the 
Administrative Law Judge precluded the issue from being reviewed on appeal. This was 
so even though the issue had been raised on administrative appeal from the ALJ's 
decision. 
Petitioner claims that the administrative decision constitutes plain error. In support 
of this claim, he relies on State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201,1208-09 (Utah 1993). 
In general, to establish the existence of plain error and to obtain 
appellate relief from an alleged error that was not properly objected to, the 
appellant must show the following: (i) An error exists; (ii) the error should 
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have been obvious to the trial court; and (iii) the error is harmful, i.e., 
absent the error, there is a reasonable likelihood of a more favorable 
outcome for the appellant, or phrased differently, our confidence in the 
verdict is undermined. If any one of these requirements is not met, plain 
error is not established. 
While arguing that an error exists, and that it was harmful, petitioner has made no 
argument that the error should have been obvious to the administrative agency. 
Normally, a decision to admit evidence is reviewed for abuse of discretion. Eggett v. 
Wasatch Energy Corp., 2004 UT 28, H 10, 94 P.3d 93. "An error is obvious if the law on 
the area was sufficiently clear or plainly settled, and the prosecutor's comments were so 
obviously improper that the trial court had an opportunity to address the error." State v. 
Larsen, 2005 UT App 201, Tf5, 113 P.3d 998. But questions of whether evidence is 
admissible are by their nature factually intensive and not clearly or plainly settled. By his 
failure to raise this issue before the administrative agency, petitioner prevented the 
agency from having the opportunity to consider his claim. 
The petitioner cannot raise his residuum argument for the first time on appeal. He 
has also failed to show that the administrative decision was plain error. 
II. A RESIDUUM OF ADMISSIBLE EVIDENCE DOES SUPPORT 
THE AGENCY'S DECISION 
Utah courts require that administrative decisions not rest exclusively on 
inadmissible evidence. "Under UAPA, [h]earsay evidence is clearly admissible in 
administrative hearings. It is also true, however, that [ujnder the residuum rule, findings 
of fact. . . must be supported by a residuum of legal evidence competent in a court of 
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law." Prosper Inc. v Dep't of Workforce Serv.. 2007 UT App 281, [^10, 168 P.3d 344 
(citations and internal quotations omitted). Admissible hearsay can be used to meet this 
standard. IcLatfl l . 
Petitioner correctly states that the testimony and evidence concerning the victim's 
statements are hearsay. But the testimony of Ms. Espinoza concerning what the victim 
told her is admissible hearsay that provides a residuum of legally competent evidence to 
support the administrative decision. Even if the declarant is available as a witness, the 
hearsay rule does not exclude statements concerning present sense impressions and 
excited utterances. Rule 803, Utah R. Evid. 
An Excited utterance is a "statement relating to a startling event or condition made 
while the declarant was under the stress of excitement caused by the event or condition." 
Rule 803(2), Utah R. Evid. The Utah Supreme Court has established a three-part test for 
determining whether a statement constitutes an excited utterance. 
First, an "event or condition" must occur that is sufficiently startling to 
cause an excitement that stills normal reflective thought processes. Second, 
the declarant's declaration must be a spontaneous reaction to the event or 
condition, not the result of reflective thought. Third, the utterance must 
relate to the startling event. 
State v.Smith, 909 P.2d 236, 239 (Utah 1995). 
Petitioner does not claim that being sexually abused fails to meet the first and third 
parts of the test. Instead the petitioner challenges the spontaneity and timeliness of the 
victim's statements. By his own testimony, petitioner states that the victim must have 
made her statements no more than an hour and a half after the abuse. Tr. 56. But the 
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evidence showed that the intervening time was much shorter. Immediately after the 
incident, Benitez testified that the victim asked him to find Ms. Espinoza. Tr. 56. Instead 
a different CNA (Kristen) joined Benitez in the victim's room. R. 34; Tr. 56. Ms. 
Espinoza entered the victim's room as Kristen was coming out. Ms. Espinoza testified 
that the victim was very upset. Tr. 42, 44. She stated that the victim appeared as if she 
wanted to cry. Tr. 44. That the victim said that Benitez had touched her breasts and 
stuck his finger in the victim's vagina. Tr. 42. The victim asked Ms. Espinoza, "How 
come you let that guy come into my room?" Tr. 42, 44. 
The hearing officer determined that the victim was still under the stress of the 
abuse at the time that Ms. Espinoza talked to her. R. 58. She was the victim who had 
been subjected to sexual abuse. She was a resident of a health care facility that needed 
help caring for herself and was therefore more susceptible to such abuse. Only sufficient 
time had elapsed since the abuse occurred for the victim to order the petitioner from her 
room and to then tell two others, Kristen and Ms. Espinoza, about the abuse. The 
evidence does not show that the victim had calmed down or was no longer under the 
effects of the abuse at the time she talked to Ms. Espinoza. 
The Utah Supreme Court will not disturb a trial court's ruling on the admissibility 
of evidence under the excited utterance exception absent a showing of clear error. State 
v. Cude. 784 P.2d 1197, 1201 (Utah 1989). There has been no showing of clear error in 
the administrative decision in this matter. The hearing officer's decision that the victim's 
statements to Ms. Espinoza met the excited utterance test should be affirmed on appeal. 
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A present sense impression is a "statement describing or explaining an event or 
condition made while the declarant was perceiving the event or condition or immediately 
thereafter." Rule 803(1), Utah R. Evid. The evidence shows that the statements were 
made immediately after the event. The victim related what Benitez had done to her to 
two individuals, one after the other. The hearing officer properly ruled that the victim's 
statements to Ms. Espinoza met the present sense impression test and was not 
inadmissible hearsay. 
Even if all of the testimony and evidence challenged by the petitioner were to be 
considered inadmissible hearsay, there would still remain a residuum of competent 
evidence that supports the administrative decision. First, Ms. Espinoza's testimony 
concerning the victim's condition shortly after the abuse took place is not hearsay. It 
corroborates the victim's statements. Ms. Espinoza knew the victim. The victim was 
very, or really upset. Tr. 42, 44. "She was kind of like she wanted to cry." Tr. 44. This 
admissible testimony supports the administrative decision. It corroborates that a 
traumatic event had just happened to the victim and supports the victim's repeated and 
consistent statement as to what that traumatic event was. 
The Final Agency Order was also supported by the petitioner's own testimony. 
His efforts to explain how he might have accidently touched the victim were found to be 
unbelievable. 
Petitioner did not deny that he wiped N.M. [the victim], and that he may 
have touched her chest area. However, he testified that N.M. asked him to 
wipe her. Regarding whether he touched her breasts, he explained that 
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N.M. was a small woman, and he recalled that perhaps her briefs were a 
size too large. Thus, when he pulled up her briefs, he could have 
inadvertently touched her breasts. The undersigned finds this explanation 
somewhat implausible. First, it seems more likely that if he were pulling up 
N.M.'s briefs, he would be holding the clothing on the sides; that is, his 
hands would not be placed on the front of the waistband. Second, it strains 
credulity to believe that N.M.'s briefs were so large that they would have 
extended close to her chest or armpits, as demonstrated by Petitioner at the 
hearing. 
R.57. 
There is a residuum of competent evidence that.supports the administrative 
decision, even if the admissible hearsay evidence is .not considered. The Final Agency 
Action should therefore be affirmed. 
CONCLUSION 
For the above stated reasons, respondent asks this Court to affirm the Final Agency 
Order substantiating the allegation of abuse against the petitioner. 
RESPONDENT DOES NOT DESIRE ORAL 
ARGUMENT OR A PUBLISHED OPINION 
Respondent-appellee does not request oral argument and a published opinion in 
this matter, though respondent desires to participate in oral argument if such is held by the 
Court. 
Respectfully submitted this ^0 day of May, 2009. 
BRENT A. BURNETT 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorney for Respondent - Appellee 
11 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I mailed two true and exact copies of the foregoing Brief of 
Respondent - Appellee, postage prepaid, to the following on this c.0 day of May, 
2009: 
Ian S. Davis 
DURHAM, JONES & PINEGAR 
Attorney for Petitioner-Appellant 
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